Heterogeneous Buyer Valuations and Binding Capacity Constraints Depress Contract Prices for Agricultural Products
Working Paper
With Richard J. Sexton. Contract procurement dominates today for most agricultural commodities in Western countries and is increasing in importance in the developing world. In the typical setting, a few processors bid for the output of many farmers whose products they value heterogeneously based on location, brand characteristics, and other factors. Modern processing/packing facilities are capital intensive with fixed capacities. Despite the predominance of this market environment, it has largely been ignored in studies of farm price determination. We address this substantial gap in the literature by modeling contract bidding in this market environment, drawing on the theory of two-sided matching. Using the Hotelling model, we show that the joint presence of heterogeneous buyer valuations and binding capacity constraints can largely attenuate the bargaining power of farms and cause farm prices to be reduced to sellers’ reservation or outside-option price even under non-collusive bidding. Any reduction in processor capacity within a market area weakly lowers every seller’s contract price, such that limiting processing capacity can be an important strategic tool for buyers to depress farm prices.
Recommended citation: Qin, Zhiran, and Richard J. Sexton. "Heterogeneous Buyer Valuations and Binding Capacity Constraints Depress Contract Prices for Agricultural Products." Working Paper.
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